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Abstract 
 
“Politics  and  the  Internet”1  is  a  critique  of  the  political  potential  of  the 
internet from the perspective of Husserl’s discussion of intersubjectivity and 
objectivity in Cartesian Meditations and Origins of Geometry. Unlike other 
critiques of the internet from a phenomenological perspective, this paper does 
not consider the limitations of internet communication from the perspective of 
the  body.  Here,  rather,  the  prime  concern  is  with  the  constitution  of 
objectivity and the ways in which the internet limits this constitution. The 
paper builds towards a consideration of the essential role of objectivity as a 
condition of possibility for politics and community. Implicit in the argument is 
a defence of print and broadcast media. 
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According to a complaint that has haunted broadcast media 
more  or  less  from  their  inception  users  have  no  immediate 
means by which to reply to the messages transmitted and by 
extension  no  direct  means  to  control  the  kind  of  information 
broadcast.  Internet  based  communication  technologies  – 
computers, laptops, smart phones, cell phones, etc., henceforth 
referred to simply as the internet – resolve this issue by giving 
every  user  the  immediate  capacity  to  respond  to  messages 
received  or  to  create  their  own  messages,  while  undesirable 
messages  can  be  blocked  or  filtered.  The  basic  argument 
suggests  that  whereas  broadcast  media  are  hierarchical,  the 
internet  is  democratic  (Poster  1995;  cf.  Holmes  2005).  As  an 
extension of its being democratic, many have argued that the 
internet  also  has  the  potential  to  recreate  the  political 
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internet and in particular so-called “social media”, it is said, are 
recreating  both  a  sense  of  community  and  revivifying  the 
democratic public sphere. 
After  almost  twenty  years  of  the  internet,  as  a  common 
communication  device,  it  is  worth  reflecting  on  the  basis  for 
these  arguments.  On  one  level,  the  arguments  appear  self-
evident. Most of us will never make TV shows or respond to TV 
shows  on  TV  shows.  The  internet  does  change  this.  I  can 
respond  to  anything  I read  or watch or  hear  on  the internet 
through  the  internet.  I  can  join  discussion  groups,  engage  in 
social media or e-mail friends; I can set up a blog, which, at 
least in principle, everyone with a computer can have access to; 
the  internet  gives  me  more  or  less  unlimited  access  to 
information  and  a  more  or  less  unlimited  ability  to  respond. 
Nonetheless, the positive responses to the introduction of the 
internet  are  also  somewhat  surprising.  Throughout  the  19th 
and 20th centuries left-wing and socialist political movements 
have almost invariably adopted a positive attitude towards the 
development of new technologies and have equally invariably 
been  disappointed.  The  three  stages  of  alarm,  resistance, 
exhaustion  mentioned  by  McLuhan  as  responses  to  new 
stresses  on  life,  seem  to  produce  quite  different  reactions  in 
those committed to socialist struggles, but the end results have 
been  the  same  (McLuhan  1994,  26).  It  is  as  if  it  were  being 
claimed  that  while  the  new  developments  in  communication 
technologies  have  each  individually  failed  to  produce  the 
desired  results,  their  integration  will  be  different.  Such  a 
situation would appear to demand caution and at least some 
degree of scepticism and perhaps a gesture to those thinkers 
who  have  engaged  in  a  critique  of  modern  social  and 
technological developments. 
In the following, I intend to re-engage the basic argument 
concerning the distinction between broadcast technologies and 
internet  based  technologies  and  their  respective  political 
significance from a phenomenological perspective. In particular, 
I will consider the nature of internet communication from the 
perspective  of  Husserl’s  theory  of  intersubjectivity.  By  and 
large,  when  phenomenologists  have  come  to  consider  the 
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Merleau-Ponty  (Dreyfus  2001;  Nagel  1998)  and  in  particular 
arguments  concerning  the  embodied  nature  of  subjectivity. 
While some indication of this argument can already be found in 
Husserl’s Ideas II and Cartesian Meditations, my intention is to 
focus more specifically on Husserl’s notion of the intersubjective 
constitution of objectivity (Husserl 1999). The reason for this 
focus, it will be argued, is that it is through the constitution of 
objectivity that communication takes on a political dimension. 
The term objectivity here is not understood as a correlate for 
truth, but rather as the constitution of an object about which 
truth  could  in  principle  be  achieved.  Objectivity  is  not  what 
actually exists in distinction from the subject, but the infinite 
task of an intersubjectively constituted community. Implicit in 
the notion of objectivity is the alter ego, others for whom the 
object  is  given  whose  experience  of  the  object  is  at  least 
potentially significantly different from my own. The object that 
is given need not be a physical object, it may also be an event, 
an  idea,  a  theory  or  even  a  task.  Moreover,  the  others  who 
constitute the community are always necessarily others whose 
experiences  can  never  become  my  experiences.  This  basic 
distinction – that the other’s experiences are inaccessible to me 
–  is  the  transcendental  condition  of  possibility  for  both 
community and objectivity. There exists a necessary difference 
at the heart of any and all community and any and all object 
constitution.  Moreover,  the  object  is  as  much  constituted 
through disagreement as it is through agreement. The object 
constitutes a tension at the heart of any and all “community 
development”  and  this  precisely  because  the  community  only 
comes into being through the alterity of the other, a point that 
refers both to the other of the community and others within the 
community. 
Many  of  the  existing  critiques  of  internet  based 
communication  are  predicated  on  problems  that  can  be 
encountered  with  more  than  one  medium.  This  is  especially 
true  of  the  argument  based  on  the  disembodied  nature  of 
internet  communication.  Disembodied  subjectivity  is  also  a 
condition with print based communication and radio. The body 
of  the  person  I  read  is  also  clearly  absent.  Moreover,  since 
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writing, we have known to be suspicious of the metaphysical 
implications of the idea of presence (Derrida 1973). And indeed, 
Husserl’s  analyses  of  intersubjectivity  reveal  a  fundamental 
non-presence of the other ego. This fundamental non-presence 
of the other renders any discussion about the presence of the 
embodied other as constitutive of intersubjectivity problematic. 
The  other  is  always  already  mediated.  The  presence  of  the 
other’s body is not the presence of the other. We speak after all 
of the body of writing and textual embodiedness is just as much 
embodiedness  as  embodiedness  thought  in  more  biological 
ways. The other is only present in her absence, and this is the 
case  whether  we  are  speaking  of  the  other  beside  me  or  the 
other that I read who has been dead for the past two thousand 
years.  Which  of  course  does  not  mean  that  there  is  not  a 
difference. The fact of being disembodied in the normal sense is 
not an argument against intersubjectivity on the internet. The 
non-presence of the other is constitutive of the very condition of 
intersubjectivity and thus of the possibility of objectivity.2 
According  to  the  argument  of  the  Cartesian  Meditations, 
intersubjectivity is the condition of possibility for objectivity for 
the simple reason that without intersubjectivity determination 
of the object could only ever be subjective. But this also means 
that  the  other’s  experiences,  as  condition  of  possibility  for 
objectivity,  cannot  be  accessible  to  me  in  the  original.  If  the 
other’s experiences were accessible to me in the original, then 
they would be my experiences and the experience of the object 
would remain subjective. This would seem to suggest that the 
other,  in  order  to  indicate  his  or  her  intentions,  would  of 
necessity need to communicate with me. This however would be 
an oversimplification of the argument. Intersubjectivity is the 
condition  of  possibility  for  communication  and  not  the  other 
way around. Implicit in the very idea of communication is the 
experience  of  the  otherness  of  the  one  with  whom  I 
communicate.  This  experience  of  otherness  however  itself 
implies that I have previously experienced the other as another 
ego,  as  someone  or  something  that  shares  this  (the  ego) 
fundamental  similarity  with  me.  According  to  Husserl,  this 
fundamental  similarity  is  not  something  that  needs  to  be 
deduced from experience, but is rather something experienced. Gregory Cameron / Politics and the Internet: A Phenomenological Critique 
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(I see someone or something engaged in an activity that I might 
at another time be engaged in.) Nonetheless, this fundamental 
similarity of having an ego is not something that I have direct 
access  to,  I  do  not  directly  experience  the  ego  of  the  other, 
rather the ego is mediated by the “body” of the other. This body, 
however, need not be the body of another human being, it may 
be  the  cry  of  the  other  heard  from  a  distance,  or  it  may  be 
another animal, or even perhaps a robot.3 
The  intersubjective  character  of  the  experience  is  the 
response  to  the  experience  that  we  make,  a  response  that  is 
always mediated, but is never necessarily mediated by another 
human  being,  nor  by  language.  There  is  always  a  “body” 
involved in intersubjectivity, but this body is never necessarily 
the body of another human being. 
The problem of the body, however, is not the whole story in 
considering  the  problem  of  intersubjectivity.  We  need  to 
reintroduce the issue of objectivity before we can begin to re-
engage  with  the  question  of  intersubjectivity.  According  to 
Husserl,  the  very  possibility  of  objectivity  requires  the  sense 
“other  ego”. Objectivity  requires  that  the  object  I consider  be 
capable of being considered by others. This idea of other egos is 
already contained in the notion of transcendent object. One of 
the  characteristics  of  transcendent  objects  is  that  their 
experience is adumbrated. What this means is that subjectively 
I  only  ever  perceive  objects  from  a  particular  perspective.  I 
never see the front back and sides of an object at the same time, 
but I do nonetheless experience the object and not merely one of 
its sides. The other sides are appresented. This idea of other 
sides appresented in my experience of objects already indicates 
the role played by other egos. The appresented backside of the 
building  I  am  looking  at  contains  an  implicit  appresented 
consciousness of that backside. 
The appresentation of the other consciousness leads Husserl 
to remark that “even if a universal plague had left only me”, 
“such  aloneness  in  no respect  alters  the  natural  world-sense, 
‘experienceable  by  everyone’,  which  attaches  to  the  naturally 
understood ego” (Husserl 1999, 93). Even in the absence of any 
other  human  being  or  even  any  other  animate  being 
whatsoever, in the natural attitude, the sense of the object as META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – III (2) / 2011 
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that  which  can  be  experienced  by  anyone  is  not  lost  and 
remains a potential aspect of any consideration of the object. 
The  same  point  as  a  corollary  applies  to  internet 
communication  concerning  objects  or  even  internet 
communications themselves. Even in the absence of the other 
we can always ask what an other would think of a given object 
or event. The objects that are constituted on the internet also 
have the sense “experienceable by everyone”. Objectivity is not 
predicated  on  the  presence  of  any  empirically  determinable 
embodied  being  and  definitely  not  on  any  empirically 
determined human being. 
It would appear, then, that Husserl has already addressed 
the problem of intersubjectivity on the internet. It is true that 
intersubjectivity  is  constituted  originally  through  embodied 
beings, but the absence of other embodied beings (in the normal 
sense of embodied, if there is a normal sense of embodied) at 
any given time does not preclude the possibility of objectivity 
(Husserl 1989, 333). This point was again stressed by Husserl 
in one of his later writings on the intersubjective character of 
knowledge  and  objectivity.  In  the  “Origins  of  Geometry”, 
Husserl  indicates  the  essential  role  played  by  writing  in  the 
constitution of ideality (Husserl 1970, 360 ff). 
Given time, it would be necessary to work through Husserl’s 
“Origins  of  Geometry”  in  detail.  The  discussions  of  language 
and  ideality,  of  the  communal  character  of  language,  of  the 
remarks on language and horizon, are each significant in the 
context of a fully worked out theory of communication on the 
internet. Here, remarks will have to be limited to the explicit 
discussion of writing. Husserl’s attention is turned to writing at 
the  moment  the  intersubjective  possibility  of  actively 
understanding the communication of objective ideal structures 
reaches the threshold of this community or this life. The ideal 
constructs of geometry are limited by the possible death of the 
individual geometer or by the disappearance of the community 
of geometers. Writing overcomes this empirical limitation and 
thus  extends  the  ideality  of  sense  beyond  the  limits  of  any 
empirically  and  naturally  determined  consciousness.  Husserl 
writes: Gregory Cameron / Politics and the Internet: A Phenomenological Critique 
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The important function of written, documenting linguistic expression is 
that it makes communication possible without immediate or mediate 
personal  address,  it  is,  so  to  speak,  communication  become  virtual. 
Through  this,  the  communalization  of  man  is  lifted  to  a  new  level. 
Written signs are, when considered from a purely corporeal point of 
view,  straightforwardly,  sensibly  experienceable;  and  it  is  always 
possible that they be intersubjectively experienceable in common. But 
as linguistic signs they awaken, as do linguistic sounds, their familiar 
significations.  The  awakening  is  something  passive;  the  awakened 
signification is thus given passively, similarly to the way in which any 
other  activity  which  has  sunk  into  obscurity,  once  associatively 
awakened, emerges at first passively as a more or less clear memory. 
In the passivity in question here, as in the case of memory, what is 
passively  awakened  can  be  transformed  back,  so  to  speak,  into  the 
corresponding activity: this is the capacity for reactivation that belongs 
originally to every human being as speaking being. Accordingly, then, 
the writing-down effects a transformation of the original mode of being 
of the meaning-structure... It becomes sedimented, so to speak. But the 
reader can make it self-evident again, can reactivate the self-evidence. 
(Husserl 1970, 361). 
One of the most striking things about this passage is that 
Husserl already indicates that the “communalization of man is 
lifted to a new level” in communication becoming virtual. It is 
as  if  Husserl  is  already  indicating  the  revitalization  of  the 
public sphere that many have associated with the new internet 
based  technologies.  Moreover,  since  Husserl  is  speaking  of 
writing and not the internet, the becoming virtual can indeed 
be understood as shifting in yet another way in the move from 
written or print documents to internet based communication. 
Despite its tone, and despite the general image that has been 
generated of Husserl, one can hear in this notion of “becoming 
virtual” indications of more recent discussions of media effects. 
Indeed,  Husserl’s  argument  is  not  unlike  that  of  McLuhan 
(Skocz  2009).  To  see  this  however  we  need  to  work  through 
Husserl’s argument carefully. 
On  first  read,  it  may  appear  that  in  the  text  just  cited 
Husserl  is  making  a  distinction  between  writing  and  speech, 
and  indeed,  in  a  way  he  is.  The  more  important  distinction, 
however, is one to which both speech and writing are subject. 
The whole paragraph is highly ambiguous. Distinctions appear 
to be made and withdrawn in the same breath: at one moment 
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equated, leaving the reader unclear what the distinction is. It 
seems  to  me,  however,  that  Husserl  is  working  with  two 
distinctions,  despite  only  making  one  explicit.  The  explicit 
distinction  between  speech  and  writing  is  that  written 
documents  allow  for  communication  without  “immediate  or 
mediate  personal  address”.  This  distinction  rests  on  the 
possible absence of the sender to the receiver and the possible 
continuation  of  communication  in  the  absence  of  any 
determinate  sender  or  receiver.  This  is  what  he  means  by 
communication  becoming  virtual.  This  absence  is  not  just 
convenient it is essential. Without writing, geometry or science 
in  general  would  run  up  against  the  limits  of  memory  and 
mortality  and  against  the  limits  of  the  mind’s  reasoning 
capacities. Without writing, science would never be capable of 
advancing beyond the most rudimentary discoveries. In being 
written  down,  the  individual  or  community’s  thoughts,  ideas 
and traditions can be preserved through the generations and 
beyond any determinate life. In being written down they can be 
added  to  and  developed.  But  they  also  run  the  risk  of 
sedimentation,  preventing  access  to  the  original  motivation 
behind the thoughts. 
Nonetheless,  Husserl  does  not  say  that  the  possibility  of 
sedimentation is absent in the case of speaking or thinking. The 
second distinction Husserl makes is between communication in 
general  and  the  “original  mode  of  being  of  the  meaning 
structure”.  Contained  in  this  idea  is  the  entire 
phenomenological  project  and  it  will  be  necessary  to  limit 
comments  to  those  which  bear  directly  on  considerations  of 
internet  communication.  The  original  mode  of  being  of  the 
meaning structure refers us to the intersubjectively constituted 
objectivities that emerge through meditations on the problems 
inherent  in  the  initial  development  of  that  about  which 
meaning is sought. That the working through of these initial 
problems  is  intersubjective  does  not  mean  that  the  original 
working  through  involved  specific  communications,  rather  it 
points to the fact that the constitution of any ideal objectivity is 
already intersubjective. The working through of the problems of 
the development of the science necessitates the constitution of 
ideal  objectivities  which  will  become  the  source  for  further Gregory Cameron / Politics and the Internet: A Phenomenological Critique 
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development.  But  the  further  development  requires  that  the 
ideal  objectivities  be  communicated,  which  means  that  they 
themselves become objects about which others can reason. The 
reception  of  these  communications,  whether  in  speech  or  in 
writing,  occurs  passively  and  not  actively  as  the  original 
constitution  occurred.  It  is  necessary  for  the  recipient  of  the 
communication  to  re-activate  the  original  sense  of  what  is 
passively  received.  This  reactivation  of  sense  allows  for  the 
possibility of the process being reversed. What emerges in such 
contexts is akin to an intersubjective activation of sense despite 
the fact that there is a necessary level of passivity involved in 
the  back  and  forth  of  communication.  This  passivity  is  not 
absent in the case of the original sense constitution and Husserl 
is  not  suggesting  that  it  is.  Husserl’s  point  is  that  in  the 
original constitution of sense there is a component of activity in 
the unmediated constitution of the objectivity of the object that, 
while  predicated  on  various  passively  accepted  modes  of 
givenness  or  sedimentation,  does  not  passively  receive  the 
actively  produced  results,  consciousness  does  not  passively 
receive  the  results  of  its  own  constituting  (Zahavi  2006).  As 
interlocutors  or  correspondents  come  to  both  be  in a  state  of 
active  constitution  the  communication  context  comes  to 
correspond to a state of intersubjective communication, but an 
actual  state  of  intersubjective  communication  is  impossible, 
communication is always mediated and as such always involves 
a  level  of  passivity  and  of  further  object  constitution.  Put  in 
other  words,  so  as  to  develop  Husserl’s  point  about  writing, 
with  reference  to  the  non-presence  of  the  other  ego, 
intersubjective  communication  is  only  ever  virtual,  an  ideal 
limit that is never in fact achieved. This impossible possibility 
is part of the meaning of the alterity of the other, and thus part 
of the condition of the constitution of objectivity. 
Nonetheless,  the  original  motivations  and  meaning 
structures behind a science are only rarely reflected on as such, 
rather  they  come  with  time  to  be  taken  for  granted  and 
assumed. Meanings are only rarely returned to the life world 
out  of  which  they  emerge.  In  the  case  of  face  to  face 
communication  this  presents  relatively  few  problems. 
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the life world. Not surprisingly, in face to face contexts we tend 
to avoid encounters in which activation of meaning demands a 
great deal of preliminary work. We come to know with whom 
we are speaking, and avoid those whose sedimented meaning 
structures differ significantly from our own. This happens more 
or less without our thinking about it. Moreover, in face to face 
contexts  certain  clues  are  already  provided  by  the  embodied 
nature of the other. These clues work to determine in advance, 
as it were, whether or not and how we will engage with the 
other.  All  of  this  leads  to  some  highly  problematic  social 
conditions,  but  the  internet  is  not  immune  to  these  kinds  of 
problems! Nonetheless, in face to face contexts it is difficult to 
avoid  all  alien  sedimented  meaning  structures.  Other  people 
have a tendency to interfere with our own habitual modes of 
going on and our own pre-constituted and naturalized meaning 
structures. Indeed, one could say that a very high percentage of 
non-internet  based  communication  is the  equivalent of  spam, 
without however the internet’s sophisticated filtering systems. 
Moreover,  it  is  not  entirely  clear  that  avoidance  of  this 
condition would be desirable, even if a great many people do in 
fact  attempt,  to  the  extent  this  is  possible,  to  limit  such 
encounters.  World  horizons  are  constantly  being  transformed 
by  encounters  with  others  and  with  objects  that  one  has  no 
conscious  desire  to  encounter.  These  encounters  disturb 
sedimented communities of sense making, opening them onto 
the other in a manner that can never be predetermined with 
respect to consequences and as such opening the social world 
onto other possibilities of communal being. (This is not to say 
that  these  other  possibilities  are  always  or  even  generally 
positive...) 
In the case of writing, of communication become virtual, the 
potential  absence  of  both  immediate  and  mediate  address 
distanciates  the  communication  event  from  any  determinate 
lifeworld giving the communication event a certain autonomy with 
respect to the meaning structures it elicits. Put another way, the 
writing  itself  becomes  objective  insofar  as  it  can  now  be 
experienced by anyone and subject to analysis as an object in its 
own right. In becoming objective, however, the written document 
increases  the  potential  for  merely  passive  reception  and  for Gregory Cameron / Politics and the Internet: A Phenomenological Critique 
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sedimentation of its content. The autonomy of the newly created 
objectivity brings about conditions in which the written document 
rather  than  the  meaning  structures  it  conveys  can  become  the 
focus  of  communal  attention.  The  written  document,  in  other 
words,  is  simultaneously  the  condition  of  possibility  for  and  a 
threat  to  scientific  inquiry.  This  radical  ambivalence  between 
condition of possibility and threat is equally present in the realm 
of  politics.  Political  institutions,  not  to  mention  political  texts, 
always run the risk of generating sedimented meaning structures 
to such an extent that the object of politics relinquishes some of its 
recalcitrance,  ceasing  to  be  the  infinite  task  of  the  community, 
becoming the sedimented condition of future meaning structures 
and future institutional possibilities. The task of both politics and 
science  is  to  remain  constantly  resistant  to  this  process  of 
sedimentation, but this vigilance is itself an infinite task and as 
such despite best intentions can never be thought of as having 
been  successful.  Indeed,  what  emerges  here  is  one  of  the  most 
profound paradoxes of Husserl’s sedimentation thesis; success at 
eliminating  sedimented  meaning  structures,  if  it  were  possible, 
would  itself  be  the  threat  of  a  new  process  of  sedimentation. 
Nonetheless, the fact of the objectivity of the written document 
means that it is always at least in principle accessible by anyone 
and this means that it perpetually remains open to the possibility 
of reactivation even after generations of sedimented and passively 
accepted interpretations. 
One  of  the  most  significant  problems  with  the  de-
sedimentation  or  reactivation  thesis  today  is  that  Husserl 
assumes that it is in fact possible. It’s impossibility seems more 
likely, and its impossibility seems most likely in consideration of 
social  and  political  issues.  Sedimentation  seems  more  like  an 
essential feature of object constitution than something that can be 
subordinated  to  the  “original  mode  of  being  of  the  meaning 
structure”. Indeed, the very idea of an original mode of being of 
the  meaning  structure  remains  highly  enigmatic.  Both  its 
reactivation and its maintenance constitute or so it seems infinite 
tasks and infinite tasks precisely of the already intersubjectively 
constituted  community.  This  in  turn  appears  to  render 
problematic the very idea of an infinite task. If the “original” is 
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appear to be a product of illusion or wishful thinking. Moreover, 
the  sedimentation  thesis  appears  to  preclude  the  possibility  of 
radical  originality  in  its  very  formulation.  Existing  meaning 
structures are themselves a product of sedimentation and cannot 
be understood as original; all meaning structures refer us back to 
an original that it is the task of the philosopher to reactivate and 
forward to an ideal that it is the responsibility of the community 
to preserve in its openness as an ideal. But both of these ideals 
insofar  as  they  become  sedimented  or  are  the  product  of 
sedimentation  run  the  risk  of  closing  us  off  to  unforeseen 
possibilities of meaning constitution. This would seem to begin to 
suggest another argument in favour of the internet. The internet 
opens  us  onto  possibilities  of  meaning  constitution  that  were 
previously  impossible.  Just  as  writing  renders  science  possible, 
making possible what would have been previously inconceivable, 
so too does the internet. Problems clearly emerge here. While the 
argument seems to make a great deal of sense, it also leaves those 
who  would  like  to  understand  the  transition  mute.  If  the  new 
technological  conditions  are  radically  transforming  the  mode  of 
being of the meaning structure then one clearly cannot resort to 
previously constituted meaning structures in order to understand 
the effects. 
In making this argument however we appear to be moving 
in circles. Either we relinquish the desire to comprehend the 
meaning  structures  that  are  coming  into  being  or  we  work 
continuously to reactivate the sense of what is in the process of 
being  lost  to  potentially  new  processes  of  sense  making.  The 
paradox  is  that  it  is  the  latter  that  most  attempts  to 
understand the effects of new communications technologies are 
attempting to do. The discussion of the communal and political 
potentials  of  the  internet  are  perhaps  as  much  attempts  to 
preserve previously sedimented meaning structures as they are 
attempts to understand the internet. The problem however is 
that  the  previously  sedimented  meaning  structures  may 
prevent us from understanding the meaning structures that are 
emerging  in  and  through  the  new  technologies.  The 
phenomenological version of this paradox indicates that even if 
sedimentation  of  previous  acquired  meaning  structures  is  an 
essential condition, de-sedimentation also remains an essential Gregory Cameron / Politics and the Internet: A Phenomenological Critique 
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feature  of  all  meaning  constitution.  Moreover,  this  relation 
between  sedimentation  and  de-sedimentation  or  reactivation 
works in two ways at once. On the one hand, there must be a 
continuous  reactivation  of  the  original  meaning  structure  of 
that which may be in the process of becoming de-sedimented in 
order that this process be noted; on the other hand, there must 
be a continuous de-sedimentation of precisely those sedimented 
meaning structures that need to be reactivated in order that 
one  remains  open  to  the  possibilities  inherent  in  the 
transforming conditions. The point, of course, is that even if the 
very idea of an original mode of being of the meaning structure 
is relinquished this does not preclude either the possibility or 
necessity  of  processes  of  reactivation  and  de-sedimentation 
even though we now have to accept the fact of the object as both 
an infinite task and fundamentally recalcitrant to any process 
of absolute sense-making. 
Moreover, it should also be noted that the object itself, and 
here the object is at least at a minimum the internet, is not a 
passive recipient of senses, but an active element in generating 
processes  of  sedimentation  which  can  radically  contradict 
previous  processes  of  sedimentation.  Nonetheless,  the  fact  of 
previous  processes  of  sedimentation  can  make  us  radically 
incapable of experiencing processes of sedimentation which are 
nonetheless underway. Here, it seems to me, Husserl’s notion of 
protention  in  his  analysis  of  internal  time  consciousness  is 
extremely  powerful.  Protention  indicates  a  level  of  inertia  in 
the  very  condition  of  experience.  Insofar  as  the  now  of 
experience  is  extended  in  the  structure  Retention-Protention, 
Husserl  indicates  the  possibility  of  the  future  orientation  of 
experience  being  overdetermined  by  elements  retained  from 
previous  experiences.  Indeed,  the  very  structure  of  time 
consciousness makes processes of sedimentation possible, if not 
necessary. The relation between retention and protention as a 
condition of possibility of sedimentation, gives to the process of 
sedimentation  something  of  the  character  of  resistance  in 
Freudian psychoanalysis. The inertia of protention covers over 
the  recalcitrance  of  the  object  in  its  emerging  processes  of 
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sedimentation and the possibility of emerging original meaning 
structures. 
The  possibility  of  a  fundamental  tension  between 
sedimentation and activation allows us to consider yet another 
sense  in  which  writing  renders  communication  virtual  for 
Husserl.  Moreover,  this  further sense  of  virtual  indicates  yet 
another problem with claims concerning the political potential 
of  the  internet.  The  second  sense  of  virtual  indicates  that 
despite  being  written  down  the  words  may  never  in  fact  be 
received either actively or passively or may suffer the same fate 
as  spoken  words,  becoming  the  victims  of  time  and 
circumstance.  This  is  clearly  a  problem  with  internet 
communications.  As  the  proliferation  of  messages  on  the  net 
approximates infinity, there is an increasing possibility that a 
posted message will never be received. This is one of Herbert 
Dreyfus’s main criticisms of internet research (Dreyfus 2001). 
While search engines differ in the way they organize relevance 
of information, it is essential that the search make selections 
based  on  information  input  by  the  user  and  categorize  the 
selection  in  terms  of  some  predetermined  criteria.  As  the 
quantity  of  information  on  the  internet  increases, it  becomes 
more  and  more  likely  that  information  retrieved  will  not  be 
relevant to the user based on her initial inquiry even with more 
and  more  powerful  algorithms.  Moreover,  much  of  what  is 
relevant  will  not  appear  in  the  initial  pages  of  the  search 
results and thus may be ignored altogether. For Dreyfus, the 
problem here is that the internet (indeed, he suggests, all data 
search  engines)  has  no  means  by  which  to  ascertain  specific 
intentions behind a given search entry. Where classification of 
search results occurs by frequency of “hits” this can mean that 
the most relevant search results are never even considered and 
that  information  relevance  comes  to  be  based  on  a  kind  of 
opinion poll or popularity contest. 
Dreyfus is concerned to indicate that data search engines 
make  inevitable  the  fact  that  relevant  information  will  be 
overlooked; the trajectory of the argument being developed here 
is  far  more  concerned  with  information  being  overlooked 
because  of  previously  established  meaning  structures.  For 
Dreyfus  the  problem  of  overlooked  material  is  a  problem 
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the  protentional  character  of  experience,  the  predetermined 
meaning structures of the potential user. The continuity with 
the  argument  made  above  should  be  self-evident.  There  the 
issue was with experience itself and here the issue is with the 
content of that experience, though the two cannot be rigorously 
separated. There the analysis was noetic, here we turn to the 
noematic. For Dreyfus the issue is relevance of information, for 
us  it  is  irrelevance  of  information  according  to  previously 
established  meaning  structures.  The  significance  of  this  shift 
can perhaps best be indicated by a consideration of face to face 
contexts. In face to face contexts it is enormously difficult, if not 
impossible, to avoid alien processes of sense making. Different 
people  react  to  this  in  different  ways:  for  some  it  is  highly 
disturbing, for others exhilarating, for others still a fact to be 
ignored  to  the  extent  this  is  possible.  Nonetheless,  the 
possibility of a disruption of established possibilities of sense 
making is a constitutive possibility of the life world. 
In face to face contexts the issue is not what is overlooked, but 
the unanticipated that cannot be overlooked. The unanticipated 
that  cannot  be  overlooked  has  the  potential  to  reactivate 
sedimented  or  naturalized  meaning  structures,  opening 
consciousness  onto  a  wider  world  or  generating  conditions  of 
apprehension. Importantly, the subject within conditions of face to 
face  encounter  has  few  means  by  which  to  prevent  disruptive 
encounters and often very few means by which to respond. My 
intentions, in fact, are forever being thwarted by unanticipated 
objective  conditions.  These  conditions  resist  my  previously 
established processes of sense making, de-sedimenting previously 
acquired meaning structures. Meaning structures, in face to face 
contexts, are more or less at the whim of objective conditions. The 
object itself poses a challenge to processes of sedimentation. This 
does  not  mean  that  within  such  contexts  new  forms  of 
sedimentation  do  not  occur  or  that  there  is  not  a  continuous 
process  of  re-sedimentation,  but  that  these  are  themselves 
constantly subject to challenges from objective conditions. In face 
to  face  contexts  there  is  no  means  by  which  to  eliminate 
completely the unanticipated or recalcitrant object. 
The  distinction  I  am  making  can  be  easily  understood  by 
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Initially, internet and library work in similar ways, both begin 
with  search  engines.  The  user  enters  the  library  or  internet 
search  engine  with  some  predetermined  question  or  some 
predetermined object in mind. Entering the question into the 
search engine, whether it be electronic or card based matters 
little, the user generates a list of possible responses. Some of 
these responses will be of little interest, some will be related to 
the initial search merely accidentally (two people with the same 
name), some will be related but not quite what one is looking 
for,  some  will  be  not  quite  what  one  was  looking  for,  but 
nonetheless contribute a mode of proceeding given the initial 
question, and sometimes one will find what one is looking for. 
Strikingly the same situation occurs here as occurs with card 
catalogues, the difference is not a difference of possibility but a 
difference  of  speed,  ease  and  possible  responses.  On  the 
internet, a failed search is easily rectified, a new search takes 
seconds to conduct, possible responses can be easily saved and 
new  questions  asked  based  on  insights  derived  from  initial 
search, and all more or less instantaneously. The problem lies 
not  in  the  possibilities  of  questions that can  be  asked  or the 
speed with which responses occur, the difficulty lies with the 
fact  that  every  search  is  based  entirely  on  user  input.  The 
object that emerges as a consequence of user input is an object 
to  some  extent  determined  by  user  input.  It  is  the  subjects 
predetermined  meaning  structures  that  determine  which 
objects will emerge. And indeed part of the problem here is that 
as users become more sophisticated in their search techniques, 
the object that emerges is more and more likely to correspond 
with intentions, i.e. more and more likely to correspond with 
predetermined meaning structures. Again all of this applies to 
the library user or the bookstore user up to a point. As soon 
however  as  the  library  user  leaves  the  catalogue,  the  object 
comes to intrude on users intentions. The catalogue, of course, 
directed me to a particular place in the library, but to get to this 
place  I  pass  hundreds  if  not  thousands  of  books  that  have 
nothing  to  do  with  the  book  I  am  seeking,  a  leisurely  stroll 
brings me into contact with subject matters that I never would 
have  dreamt  of  entering  into  a  search  engine,  and  probably 
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probably would have ignored if they did. When I reach the place 
where the book I am seeking is supposed to be, it is surrounded 
by  potentially  hundreds  of  books  by  the  same  or  different 
authors on the same or more or less the same subject4 which I 
have no choice but to scan if I am to find the book I am looking 
for and this especially if the book has been mis-shelved. These 
books are themselves surrounded by groups of books on what 
someone else – the librarian, the Library of Congress, etc. – has 
decided are related subjects, quite possibly a connection I would 
not  have  made  left  to  my  own  predetermined  meaning 
structures and as such never would have encountered by means 
of an internet search. What I encounter in the shelves are a 
group of objects which quite possibly never would have been the 
object  of  a  search  that  I  intentionally  conducted  and  quite 
possibly  never  would  have  emerged  as  the  result  of  an 
accidental  (that  is  if  accidental  is  even  possible  here) 
association of terms I entered into the search engine. What I 
encounter, as in the case of face to face encounters, is an object 
or group of objects that have the potential to expand or even 
disrupt my previously established habits of meaning making. 
Of course, it is not the case that when I go to the library, I 
always encounter objects I would never have dreamt of seeking 
out, it is at least in principle possible to go to directly to the 
book being sought and not notice any others, and it is the case 
that in performing internet searches I do sometimes discover 
things I would never have consciously sought, but the difference 
is not merely a matter of degree. In scanning the shelves at the 
library,  I  am  necessarily  the  passive  recipient  of  another’s 
decisions  even  if  I  know  exactly  what  I  am  looking  for.  In 
opening a link on an internet search, in moving from page to 
page of possible links or in seeking beyond exactly what I am 
looking for, I am always and necessarily actively engaged in my 
choices, unless of course I accidently click a link, but even this 
accident cannot be traced back to objective meaning structures. 
The point here is not that there are too many possibilities 
available on the internet, as the sheer volume of internet traffic 
might  make  one  assume;  the  problem  is  that  the  objects 
encountered are too determined by the subject. The excess of 
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much smaller excess of the library is instantly encountered as 
such.  The  excess  of  the  library  is  the  excess  of  a  world  that 
exceeds the very possibility of my consciousness of it. Recent 
studies of the internet have suggested that as much as 95% of 
messages sent are in fact spam, we fail to realize this because 
most  spam  is  today  blocked  by  filters.  The  internet  is  the 
equivalent  of  a  bookstore  or  a  library  that  had  a  device  to 
prevent me from seeing any book that I had not at least to some 
extent  previously  intended.  The  internet  is  a  device  that 
restricts, to the extent this is possible, the objective character of 
information,  the  object  pole  of  consciousness,  to  a  mere 
correlate  of  a  previously  established  meaning  structure.  The 
“real world” opens up, whereas the virtual world closes down, 
especially as search algorithms become more sophisticated, not 
because I become a disembodied subject, but because the world 
ceases  to  be  objective,  ceases  to  be  an  object  potentially 
recalcitrant to my intentions. 
It  has  been suggested however  that, while  this may have 
once  been  the  case,  these  kinds  of  limitations  of  internet 
communication  have  been  overcome  as  a  consequence  of  so-
called social media. Moreover, the political significance of social 
media has been manifest in what has come to be known as the 
“Arab Spring” – the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, 
and the uprisings in Bahrain and Syria, etc. Two points need to 
be made, the first philosophical following the above discussion, 
the second empirical of which I will only say a few words in the 
context of the discussion of politics below. 
The  argument  above  suggests,  in  part,  that  one  of  the 
consequences of internet based communication is that in order 
to receive information I have to actively seek it out. Even when 
receiving  e-mail,  I  have  the  capacity  to  filter  unwanted 
messages either manually through deletion or by adjusting the 
settings on my spam filter. This ability to filter is impossible in 
face to face interactions. I cannot chose what I want to see or 
hear  because  the  objective  world  precisely  resists  my 
intentions. Social media, such as facebook, twitter, myspace or 
academia.edu, etc., are said to be an attempt to return some of 
this  objectivity  to  internet  communication.  This  argument, 
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above. While it is not the case that social media precludes my 
being a passive recipient of messages from others, it is still the 
case that the levels of active choice far exceed that of face to 
face contexts. Indeed, what is most striking about social media 
is that I actually chose precisely those people from whom I will 
receive  information.  An  internet  search  in  general  does  not 
preclude me from acquiring information from people I do not 
know,  people  from  whom  I  have  not  and  would  not  chose  to 
receive information, but social media are actually predicated on 
this initial choice. In the example of the library above we are 
confronted  by  objects  for  which  we  would  never  have 
deliberately sought, in no way have we restricted the egos that 
will enter into our fields of consciousness. Social media may not 
limit the information we may receive, but it has rendered the 
“egos” from whom we will receive information a determination 
of  my  own  choices.  In  the  context  of  social  media,  I  actually 
have the power to delete not information, but precisely subjects, 
something that has been attempted in the world of face to face 
communications, but is increasingly today frowned upon. In the 
context  of  normal  internet  searches  it  is  the  object  that  is  a 
determination  of  my  subjectivity,  in  social  media  the  subject 
him or herself is a product of my decisions, a reflection of my 
own ego. The preconstituted meaning structures then have the 
potential to not only determine what information I will receive, 
but even those from whom I will receive it. It is as if, as an 
ideal, the  internet  would  only  provide me with  information I 
had already intended from people with whom I already know 
and already agree. Not only is the recalcitrance of the object 
threatened, so too is the alterity of the other ego. 
It  should  not  be  assumed  that  the  constant  references  to 
face to face communication above indicate a reference to some 
primordial  state  of  communication.  This  primordial  state  is 
already  precluded  by  Husserl’s  reference  to  the  essential 
passivity underlying all communicative acts. The reference to 
face to face communication has been elicited by the tradition in 
communication  theory  which  suggests  that  with  the  new 
electronic  and  more  importantly  digital  modes  of 
communication we are entering a new age of orality. This new 
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aural  over  the  visual  and  the  increasing  potentials  of 
instantaneous communication. The difference between the new 
and the old lies in the proximity of the other with whom one 
communicates.  Within  oral  societies,  the  dominant  mode  of 
communication demands the physical proximity of the body of 
the one with whom I communicate. We have already considered 
the ways in which this presentation of the difference is riddled 
with idealist abstractions, but this does not mean that there is 
not still a difference. 
Communication  theorists  have  tended  to  understand 
communication epochs solely through the mode of communication 
and not through the equally significant possibilities of experience 
and world constitution. As already suggested, within contexts of 
face to face communication the subject has very little control over 
the kinds of messages it will receive. The subject, in other words, 
is an opening onto the world which confronts it with its infinite 
variety  of  recalcitrant  phenomena.  Sedimented  meaning 
structures, with their necessary reference to the intersubjective 
community,  must  remain  open  to  and  capable  of  incorporating 
both the unanticipated and the incomprehensible – unanticipated 
and  incomprehensible  at  least  from  the  perspective  of  the 
previously  constituted  meaning  structure.  Meaning  structures 
must  remain  open  to  adjustment  and  reconstitution  in  their 
confrontation with the object and thus remain perpetually open to 
the intersubjective constitution of radically new objectivities. That 
these objectivities tend to be constituted from within previously 
sanctioned modes of making sense should not detract us from the 
perpetual  processes  of  reconstitution  necessitated  by  the 
inevitability of otherwise recalcitrant objects. 
Within this context of face to face communication the other ego 
is of necessity both a condition of possibility for and a threat to 
communally sanctioned modes of making a sense. The other ego is 
the  indeterminate  other  of  previously  constituted  objectivities, 
precisely  that  which  threatens  perpetually  to  thwart  my 
previously  constituted  habitualities  of  making  sense.  The  other 
ego  and  the  unanticipated  or  unanticipatable  object  are  the 
indeterminate horizon of all sense making and as such open the 
possibilities of making sense onto the infinite and as such open the 
world onto the possibility of not making sense at all. Strikingly, Gregory Cameron / Politics and the Internet: A Phenomenological Critique 
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perhaps,  it  is  this  condition  of  the  possibility  of  the  world  not 
corresponding  to  my  intentions,  and  thus  the  possibility  of  not 
making sense, that we encounter through the various mass media 
and in particular through broadcast media. The book I am reading 
may disturb me, upset my preconceptions, force me to think of 
things I would rather ignore. Unless the TV program has been 
seen  before,  we  cannot  know  in  advance,  beyond  certain  basic 
formal elements, the kinds of images or subject matters it will 
contain. The broadcast constitutes a kind of radical otherness to 
our intentions. We can change the channel, but while the TV is on 
we are subject to the decisions of another and generally another 
who  remains  almost  completely  unknown  to  us  or  even 
anonymous,  and  this  condition  is  precisely  the  nature  of  the 
technological limitation of the medium itself. And while TV does 
have  the  potential  to  bring  about  sedimented  process  of  sense 
making,  especially  those  that  correspond  to  the  corporate  and 
political conditions of TV programming, it also has the potential to 
reveal, by rendering objective, unpleasant or disturbing previously 
constituted processes of sense making in ways that normal face to 
face and internet communication do not. Moreover, unlike social 
media in which we only engage with those with whom we already 
agree or with those we chose to disagree, TV has the potential to 
present  positions  and  perspectives  from  people  with  whom  we 
would never chose to associate and with whom we may disagree in 
ways that preclude either face to face or facebook associations.5 
The internet allows us to transmit messages and generate 
critique at a rate and in a quantity unprecedented in human 
history.  But  it  allows  sense  making  to  be  determined  by  the 
subject  more  profoundly  than  ever  before  in  the  history  of 
humanity.  The  object  which  has  the  potential  to  disrupt 
processes of sense making recedes into the background and the 
world  ceases  to  have  the  potential  to  collapse  into  a  state  of 
senselessness. Making sense is an activity that emerges as a 
consequence of a perpetual confrontation, a confrontation that 
has the potential to become political as it becomes communal. 
The object always constitutes a potential threat to previously 
constituted  conditions  of  sense-making,  the  subject  is  of 
necessity resistant to this threat. The internet runs the risk of 
eliminating  this  threat  all  together.  If  the  internet  were  the META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – III (2) / 2011 
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only  means  by  which  we  received  information,  then  the 
possibilities of making sense and even of making sense of the 
internet would  vanish.  Making  sense  only  occurs  against  the 
threat  of  no  longer  making  sense  and  it  is  this  threat  of  no 
longer  making  sense  from  the  perspective  of  the  community 
that constitutes the space of politics. 
At the centre of any political engagement is an object that is 
the  object  of  potential  disagreement;  the  infinite  task  of  the 
political community – and here we can think object either as that 
about which we agree or disagree or as that towards which we are 
heading, or indeed as the community itself. It is the recalcitrance 
of these objects with respect to the community that constitutes the 
space of politics. It is the recalcitrance of the object, the fact that it 
forces us onto processes of de-sedimentation and re-sedimentation, 
that  constitutes  the  political  community  as  political.  Insofar  as 
internet  communication  is  self-selected  communication,  the 
internet  decreases  the  recalcitrance  of  the  object,  profoundly 
restricting  the  conditions  for  the  constitution  of  objectivity, 
completing the potential to fulfill every desire denied to broadcast 
media,  and  perhaps  in  the  long  run  eliminating  the  very 
possibility of politics and community. 
Although initially the mainstream news media, and again 
TV  in  particular,  presented  the  recent  revolutions  and 
uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East as though social 
media played a significant if not decisive role, the same news 
media have subsequently suggested that the role played may 
have  been  overstated.6  This  fact  is  not  really  surprising.  A 
quick  glance  at  the  World  Bank’s  Development  Indicators 
(2010),  easily  available  on-line,  suggests  that  in  2009  only 
33.5% of the Tunisians, 20% of Egyptians, 18.7% of Syrians and 
5.5%  of  Libyans  were  internet  users.  The  notion  of  “internet 
user”  does  not  imply  ownership  of  the  means  of  access;  it 
includes  those  who  access  the  internet  through  cafes  and 
libraries  and  on  university  campuses  or  at  work.  These 
numbers should be compared to the more than 75% in the UK 
and  the  US.  More  importantly,  the  governments  of  these 
countries have at one point or another all shut down internet 
access, and yet events continued to unfold. As such, while it is 
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available,  have  been  essential  to  the  dissemination  of 
information to  the outside world,  their  roles in  the  uprisings 
themselves – with the possible exception of Tunisia – must have 
been extremely limited. Of significantly more importance was 
the information disseminated by Al Jazeera, but even here we 
are failing to think the uprisings from the perspective of what is 
essential to the possibility of political action. 
Following Husserl, it would be wrong to understand posts 
on social media as if they were not objects with possible effects. 
Despite beings objects, however, these were not the objects at 
the heart of the uprisings. At the heart of the uprisings were 
social  and  institutional  conditions  which  demanded  a 
communal  response  or  to  be  more  precise  constituted  a 
community  where  previously  there  was  only  an  aggregate. 
What occurred was not merely a result of the production and 
receipt of information, however objective that information was, 
it has just as significantly been a case of being caught up in 
conditions  as  they  unfolded  without  anyone  having  a  clear 
sense of what was unfolding. Subjectivities are caught up in the 
radical recalcitrance of the object, they become subject to that 
object and act in accordance. Thus while North Africa and the 
Middle East have erupted in demands for fundamental social 
and  political  change,  in  North  America  and  Europe  what 
demonstrations there have been have been motivated by single 
issues – tuition increases, for example – or have been random 
and  seemingly  unmotivated,  without  even  vague  underlying 
objectives.7 
Despite massive inequalities of wealth, economic conditions 
that  have  not  been  experienced  since  the  thirties,  global 
warming,  unjust  wars  and  global  insecurity,  bankrupt  or 
simply  barbaric  medical  systems,  etc.  in  those  places  with 
greatest  access  to  information  serious  political  unrest  seems 
less  likely  than  at  any  other  time  in  the  modern  period.  In 
radical  distinction  from  the  more  affluent  periods  following 
WWII, and especially the 1960s and 70s, not accidentally the 
heyday  of  television,  serious  social  unrest  in  the  age  of  the 
internet appears highly improbable. It appears that the claims 
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social, political and cultural conditions fulfil a purely ideological 
function. 
The  object  is  the  centre  about  which  politics  is  possible: 
without  this  object  there  is  no  politics,  no  community,  no 
subject. The internet does not eliminate otherness; it is always 
possible that I will stumble unexpectedly across a website that 
disturbs my expectations. But unlike TV or newspaper articles, 
communication  on  the  internet  is  to  a  much  greater  extent 
determined  and  controlled  by  the  user.  The  user  inputs 
information and selects what she feels will be relevant topics, 
she  may  even  select  those  from  whom  she  will  receive 
information.  E-mail  can  be  controlled  by  spam  filters  and 
address  blocking,  or  by  deletion.  Even  what  is  called  web 
surfing is controlled to a much greater extent by the surfer than 
channel surfing or the more oceanic variety. This ability for the 
user  to  control  the  kinds  of  information  he/she/it  receives  is 
simply  not  present  to  the  same  degree  in  any  other  mode  of 
communication.  This  does  not  eliminate  the  fact  of 
intersubjectivity, but it does seriously transform the conditions 
of object constitution and the objectivity of that about which we 
communicate.  This  transformation  rather  than  opening  the 
user onto the world of infinite possibility has the potential to 
merely sediment, to an unprecedented level, previous acquired 
meaning structures. Moreover, while the otherness of the other 
is still a fact to be taken into consideration, this otherness can, 
at least to a certain extent, be controlled by the user and this 
seriously transforms the conditions of community constitution. 
That it is the user who controls the conditions of constitution of 
both  community  and  objectivity  seriously  compromises  the 
possibility of anything like a politics or a public sphere from 
emerging.  Much  like  suburban  car  culture,  the  internet  user 
controls  and  perhaps  even  eliminates  his  or  her  encounters 
with  those who  may  have  the potential to  upset  processes of 
sedimentation,  and  as  a  result  seriously  jeopardizes  the 
possibility  of  the  emergence  of  objective  meaning  structures. 
The  internet  has  the  potential  to  work  towards  the 
subjectivization of all meaning and community, eliminating the 
necessary otherness of the other, be it object or ego. 
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NOTES 
 
 
1 I would like to thank the editors and reviewers of Philosophy Study for their 
insightful comments and suggestions. I would also like to thank members of 
the Society for Phenomenology and Media and the Society for Existential and 
Phenomenological  Research  and  Culture  for  their  constructive  critique  of 
various  versions  of  the  arguments  presented  here.  Finally,  I  would  like  to 
thank Dr. Deidre Rose for her constant engagement with and observations on 
various stages of the production of this paper. 
2  This  argument  should  not  suggest  a  disagreement  concerning  the 
significance of the lived body; the point in this context merely concerns the 
significance of the body in communication, and indicates that I have no desire 
to privilege face to face communication as a means by which to argue against 
the internet. This basic point indicates that this paper will not be concerned 
with arguments based on the importance of the internet for those incapable, 
for  whatever  reason,  of  engaging  in  face  to  face  communication.  Valery’s 
arguments concerning the radio continue to apply (Valery 1964). 
3  A  common  theme  in  science  fiction.  These  fictional  representations  work 
precisely because the ego is not accessible to the other. What is perceived is 
the  fundamental  similarity,  and  this  produces,  regardless  of  technological 
mediation the experience of other ego. It takes an act of will to not see the 
android  as  an  other  ego  and  precisely  for  this  reason  often  stands  as  a 
powerful metaphor for racism. 
4  “Same  subject”  is  also  far  more  complex  then  it  might  seem.  What  the 
library determines as belonging to the same subject may have no relation to 
what I might have thought was the subject matter of the book I sought. 
5 In presenting aspects of the argument here at various academic conferences 
this  particular  argument  has  been  the  most  misunderstood  and  the  most 
criticized.  The  reason  for  this  misunderstanding  and  criticism  reveals  the 
extent to which the internet has performed its ideological work. One assumes 
that information provided by TV will be both already of interest to the viewer 
and  be  presented  from  perspectives  with  which  the  viewer  already  agrees. 
That this has not always been the case can be ascertained by consideration of 
images of the Vietnam War during the heyday of TV broadcasting. TV here 
precisely  resulted  in  massive  protests  and  demonstrations  against  the 
existing social and political conditions. One can easily add further examples 
from  the  Civil  Rights Movement  or  the  Women’s  Movement.  Nothing  even 
remotely comparable has occurred since the introduction of the internet and 
even less so since the introduction of social media in those places where it is 
most prevalent. 
6 See, in particular, Frank Rich’s excellent op-ed from February 5, 2011 in The 
New York Times (Rich 2011). Clearly, however, once the cat has been let out 
of the bag even insightful pieces like Rich’s cannot put it back in. No doubt, as 
Rich explains, part of the reason for the claims made on behalf of facebook 
and twitter is that news agencies want to appear “hip”, but it also gives to the 
rest of us a sense that we are nonetheless participating in our own small way 
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simply by signing up. The fact that it is likely that a revolution of the kind 
seen  in  Tunisia  or  Egypt  would  not  have  happened  if  “social  media”  were 
more widespread rarely even enters the equation. The question of ideology 
and the internet requires far more serious consideration. And this is also to 
say nothing of the enhanced possibilities for surveillance brought about by 
widespread internet use – an extremely important point in recent events in 
London and Vancouver which never took on a political dimension 
7 This observation would seem to be contradicted by the case of Greece, but 
then one would need to take into consideration that Greece has the smallest 
number of internet users in the EU at a mere 44%. 
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